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Abstract: In recent decades, the concept of religion, and specifically its
application to non-Western historic cultural formations has come unter critical
scrutiny. This paper proposes the study of semantic fields as a method to explore
the self-understanding of historic formations of what, in modern parlance,
counts as religion, and thus, as a testing strategy for the concept of religion
that is employed in scholarly analysis. It uses the said method to analyse three
works by the medieval Japanese Buddhist monk Dōgen (1200–1253), who came
to be revered as founder of the still extant Sōtō school of Zen Buddhism. By
putting his notion of the ‘Buddha Way’ (butsudō) into strong relief, it provides a
basis for comparison with modern concepts of religion. The conclusion is that
Dōgen’s ideas conform to a surprisingly large extent with modern ideas. This
may be one reason for his popularity in modern times. But Dōgen should not be
taken to represent the general world-view of medieval Japan. Further compara-
tive analyses of other corpora remain necessary to gauge the applicability of
‘religion’ as a category for the analysis of medieval Japanese culture.
Keywords: concept of religion, Zen Buddhism, Medieval Japan, Dōgen,
semantic fields
1 ‘Religion’ after, and before, ‘religion’
Sometimes one is tempted to think that modernity, like Kronos, eats its own
children. Or at least it seems to try hard to do so. The concept of religion is a
case in point – at least if we follow the narrative put forth by scholars like
Jonathan Z. Smith, and others, that “man, more precisely western man, has had
only the last few centuries in which to imagine religion.”1 To Smith, ‘religion’ is
Raji C. Steineck, Asien-Orient-Institut, Universität Zürich, Zürichbergstrasse 4, 8032 Zürich,
Switzerland. E-mail: raji.steineck@aoi.uzh.ch
1 Smith 1997: xi.
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a modern invention, and “solely the creation of the scholar’s study.” If that were
true, ‘religion’ has come under attack from a new generation within precisely
that group which had created it in the first place. I confess, however, to having
doubts concerning this narrative. In fact, the literature that is adduced to finish
off with ‘religion’ as a transtemporal and cross-cultural concept stops short of
doing so: instead, it elucidates how a historically and culturally limited con-
ceptualization of religion, construed after the paradigm of Western protestant-
ism with its emphasis on a soteriology of belief in a transcendent numinous
entity whose will is documented in a sacred scripture, leads, on the analytical
level, to misrepresentations of the cultural institutions in question, their
self-understanding, and their contexts.2 It further demonstrates how legal, poli-
tical and social practices informed by that concept, on the other hand, have
re-shaped pre-existing cultural landscapes and incited institutional reforms
from both without and within ‘religious’ bodies.3 This very process, ironically,
is one of the reasons why religion, as a cultural reality, has not gone away after
the critique of ‘religion’. The child is, in sum, not that of Kronos, and he has
failed to eat it.
Be that as it may, I believe that the “critique of ‘religion’ as a cross-cultural
category”4 served well to elucidate epistemological shortcomings and ideologi-
cal agendas related to the over-generalization of a certain, limited conceptuali-
zation of the term. It has furthermore made us aware of a variety of alternatives,
whether proposed under the heading of ‘religion’ or not, and of the formative
power that the said concept of religion had, within the period of classical
modernity5, over and against its alternatives. In studying what we have come
to subsume under the category of religion, we will do well to remember these
points.
First of all, we need to be aware that to address some source, or behavior, or
institution as ‘religious’ is, at least in all instances where this does not conform
with the self-identification of the object of analysis, first and foremost a state-
ment about our received notions of it. The implications of said subsumption
2 Or this is how I read, for example, Asad 2001; King 1999; Ford Campany 2003; Shields 2010.
3 For the case of Japan, see eg. Snodgrass 2003, esp. pp. 115–154; Josephson 2006. Since this
contribution is addressing readers without Japanological background as well, I refer to research
literature in English wherever possible.
4 Fitzgerald 1997.
5 The term ‘classical modernity’ was introduced by Peter Osborne (1992: 68) in a critical
historiographical essay, where it referred to the “long nineteenth century”; I would use another
formulation of Osborne’s and describe classical modernity as “as the golden age of its cultural
self-consciousness” (Osborne 1992: 72) – the time when the classic theories of modernity of
Marx, Durkheim, Weber, and Simmel were formulated. See also Habermas 2012: 445.
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have to be made explicit, and they should be tested against the available
evidence. Both demands are difficult to meet, albeit for different reasons: the
first one requires a self-conscious questioning of one’s agenda that will, of
necessity, be limited by one’s evaluation of what is trivial and self-evident,
and what is possibly problematic. The second demand poses the more pedes-
trian, but similarly tricky problem of how to design testing strategies that lead us
out of the circle of our preconceptions.
In this paper, I propose the study of semantic fields as one such testing
strategy, and thus, a viable avenue to advance a nuanced analysis of the
‘religious’. In doing so, I do not mean to champion this approach as an exclusive
one; quite to the contrary, I believe that it is in need of complementation, e. g.
via the study of legal norms, or of pertinent social practices. Even so, I sustain
that studying the semantic field of the ‘religious’ can provide critical insights
into the cognitive organization operative in a given corpus. And this may
eventually also be of help in shaping alternative avenues for research into the
matter in question.
There are two basic components to the kind of study I want to propose: the
first is discourse analysis, i. e. the analysis of the modes of communication and
the semantical sequences operative in the corpus in question.6 The second
component is the analysis of the semantic relations among key terms used to
identify and characterize what we subsume under the ‘religious.’ In other words,
here we ask how those words that are used to identify and characterize what we
understand to be a case of ‘religion’ are connected both logically and in terms of
their respective meaning.7 The first component may not usually be considered to
be part of the analysis of semantic fields. However, such analysis is crucial if we
are interested in reconstructing the meaning of ‘religious’ utterances for those
who used them, because the significance of an utterance is largely determined
by the modes of communication and the types of semantical sequence it
employs.8
While this kind of analysis may be conducted on any text that appears, to
us, as a token of religion, some types of documents can be considered to be of
special significance for our problem, i. e. the relationship between the category
6 ‘Modes of communication’ here refers to the model of communication proposed by Roman
Jakobson; in relation to the six elements of his model (sender, message, receiver, code, channel,
context), he distinguishes the emotive, poetic, conative, metalinguistic, phatic and referential
mode of communication (cf. Jakobson 1960). ‘Semantical sequence’ refers to Jean Michel
Adam’s theory of five basic kinds of organising propositions, i. e. the narrative, the descriptive,
the explicative, the argumentative, and the dialogical sequence (Adam 2005).
7 Löbner 2002: 74–98 provides for a good overview and discussion of the pertinent relations.
8 This proposition is discussed in some detail by linguist J. M. Adam (2005: 19–28).
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of religion and the cultural realities (including cognitive orientations) of the
sources to which the category is applied. Generally speaking, I am refering to
documents in which some cultural unit, which we believe to embody religion,
is established as a matter of concern, either in order to delimit it over against
other units, or in order to elucidate its substance and characteristics, or both.
This may happen from the inside of a given unit, or from its outside—in fact, in
documents concerned with delimitation of a unit x vis à vis other units yz, the
internal and the external modes co-exist with some necessity. The following
table gives examples of pertinent document types:9
A systematic study of available documents of these kinds in a given cultural
situation should provide us with a realistic understanding of how the field of
what we term ‘religion’ was framed by relevant actors at a specific time and
place – was ‘religion’ considered as a field of its own, with a claim to a specific
kind of authority and validity, over and against e. g. political authority or legal
validity? If yes, under what name and associated with which kinds of preroga-
tives? If no, which categories subsumed what we understand to be religion?
Table 1: Document types identifying the “religious”.
Document type Semantic function
delimitation
– administrative, legal or historiographical
texts concerned with the relation between
different kinds of authority
– of norms and spheres of authority
(religious vs. secular or other)
– inter-denominational discussions,
comparisons
– from other teachings / traditions
internal differentiation
– texts establishing a new school / teaching – of sub-denominations (schools, groups, etc.)
– texts regulating the relationship between
denominations
– classifications of expertise (curricula,
layouts of institutional organisation etc.)
– of essential subjects, themes, issues
within the tradition
9 This overview is the result of a discussion meeting between members of the research group
“Concepts and Taxonomies” at University of Zurich’s research priority program “Asia and
Europe,” held in June 2011. Participants were: Slava Vetrov, Christoph Uehlinger, Raji
Steineck, Roman Seidel, Peter Schreiner, Ulrich Rudolph, Angelika Malinar, Philip
Hetmanczyk, Robert H. Gassmann, Wolfgang Behr. I am indebted to all members of this
group for substantial contributions to the shaping of my framework of analysis.
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What kind of sub-categories existed, and what was conceived of as differentiae
specificae? The results of such analysis may then be compared to indicators of
implicit understandings.
1.1 The corpus: Dōgen’s instructions for seekers
on the Buddha way
In the following, I shall provide one part of such an analysis for a historical
situation that has received much attention by scholars of Japanese religion,
namely that of the early medieval period (the so-called Kamakura period,
1192–1333 CE). I will analyze pertinent writings of the Buddhist monk Dōgen
(1200–1253), who, some generations after his demise, came to be revered as the
founder of the Japanese Sōtō School of Zen Buddhism.10 He thus belongs to the
group of founding figures who, in the classical modern view of Japanese
religious history, brought about the popularization and indigenization of
Buddhism in Japan.11 I will discuss the potential shortcomings of that choice
in a later paragraph. For now, it may suffice to say that he was a figure of
some, though not eminent, relevance in his day. His attempt to establish
himself as the leading proponent of the Buddha’s teaching met with failure.
But he produced voluminous writings concerned with identifying and elucidat-
ing a comprehensive agenda for realizing the “Buddha Way” (Butsudō 仏道) –
an agenda that has, so far, been more or less unambiguously described in
modern literature as ‘religious.’ Additional characterizations, such as the
identification of Dōgen as one of Japan’s most important philosophers, are,
to my knowledge, never combined with the proposition that he was not a
religious thinker.12 The aim of the following analysis is to evaluate how this
10 On the formation of Dōgen as a canonical figure, see Bodiford 2006.
11 This historiographical theory was famously criticized by Kuroda Toshio in the 1970s. See
Kuroda 1996 and the re-evaluation of his intervention by Sueki Fumihiko (Sueki 1996).
12 Watsuji Tetsurō, who has arguably been most seminal in pushing for a philosophical reading
of Dōgen, says in his introduction: “I would be content if what I am writing would cause people to
take interest in this outstanding religious person (shūkyōka宗教家) and if it became clear that the
essence of our culture cannot be correctly understand without reflecting on religionists of his
kind.” (Watsuji 1992 [1926]: 237). Steven Heine states in the preface to his Existential and
Ontological Dimensions of Time in Heidegger and Dōgen: “Finally, the work attempts to gorund
comparative philosophy and religion in a specific yet universal issue, underscoring the differences
between Heidegger’s theoretical approach to ontological disclosure and Dōgen’s insistens that
philosophy can and must spring from direct religious experience.” (Heine 1985: ix)
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general assessment relates to the way he described his own agenda and
positioned it in the cultural world around him.
A voluminous corpus of texts is rubricized under the author Dōgen; some
of them, most famously the Shōbōgenzō正法眼蔵13 collection of treatises in the
vernacular, include his own original compositions, others are compilations
from Zen lore by himself (the so-called Mana-Shōbōgenzō, or Shōbōgenzō
sanbyakusoku 正法眼蔵三百則) or edited records of his sayings compiled by
his disciples in either Sino-Japanese (the Eihei kōroku 永平公録) or vernacular
Japanese (the Shōbōgenzō zuimonki 正法眼蔵隋聞記).14 I have selected five of
his original compositions as the basis for this study: the Bendōwa 辨道話
(“Discourse on negotiating the way”)15, his first doctrinal exposition, written
in 1231 in the vernacular, while Dōgen was living in relative obscurity in an
abandoned temple south of the capital; Gakudō yōjin shū 學道用心集
(“Essentials in the Study of the Way”)16, written three years later as a basic
introduction for the growing group of his monastic disciples; the fascicles
Bukkyō 佛教 (“Buddha’s Teaching”) and Bukkyō 佛經 (“Buddha’s Sūtras”)17,
both written at a time when Dōgen faced a group of new disciples from an
outlawed rival Zen lineage, who sought protection in his community but
apparently held views he did not condone, and was confronted with increasing
adversity, eventually prompting a re-location from the capital to a remote
location in North-Western Japan; finally, Shizen bikku 四禪比丘 (“The bhikṣu
[‘monk’] in the fourth stage of immersion”), a text from the new redaction of
the Shōbōgenzō, written around 1250 at the latest stage in his career. This text
once more treats what Dōgen perceives to be aberrant teachings among Zen
Buddhists in his day.18 In terms of the analytical matrix sketched out above,
the five works can be related in the following manner:
13 I use the Hepburn system for transcriptions from the Japanese. In quotes from Japanese
sources, I use traditional (unabridged) characters if these are used by the edition cited.
14 There are by now three modern editions of his collected writings, and numerous editions
and translations of selected works. I use Ōkubo Dōshū’s two volume-edition of the collected
writings (Ōkubo 1969), quoted below as DZZ I and II. As for translations into English (ET)
besides those quoted below, see the Stanford Sōtō Zen Text Project (http://scbs.stanford.edu/
sztp3/), and Leighton 2004; Leighton and Okumura 1996. See also Heine (1997) for a discussion
of the relative position and importance of his writings, and Steineck (2014) for a discussion of
the various constellations of authorship in the works belonging to that “canon”.
15 DZZ I: 729–746; ET Waddell and Abe 1971.
16 DZZ II: 253–260; ET in Tanahashi 1985: 31–44.
17 DZZ I: 405–414; ET in Nishijima 1994–1999, vol. 3: 101–113.
18 DZZ I: 704–716; ET in Nishijima 1994–1999, vol. 4: 187–194.
182 Raji C. Steineck
Bereitgestellt von | UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zürich
Angemeldet
Heruntergeladen am | 17.05.18 09:25
The chronological order is of some importance, because the texts represent all
stages of Dōgen’s writing career. There has been extensive discussion about
whether or not his teaching underwent significant changes in terms of its
essential content: on the one side of the spectrum of opinions, some scholars
have argued that he started out with a fairly universalistic and philosophical
bent, but lapsed into increasing sectarianism in later stages of his career
(as represented by the fascicles “Buddhist Sūtras” and Shizen bikku).19 On
the opposite side, some see a turn from antinomian, elitist mystical philosophy
to a more orthodox brand of Buddhism precisely in his later years.20 I would
concur with Steven Heine’s assessment of the problems associated with either
position – namely that both of them are based on selective chronologies and
corpora, and ignore the discursive setting of the writings in question, which
addressed different audiences in highly divergent situations.21 Furthermore, as
will become clear in the following paragraphs, Dōgen is consistent in his
polemic against a certain brand of mystical monism that is conducive to
ethical antinomianism and doctrinal syncretism, and he upholds a position
that he styles as orthodox Buddhist teaching.
On a different note, the titles of the first two writings, Bendōwa and Gakudō
yōjin shū, make apparent the fact that, to both Dōgen and his adressees, it was
Table 2: Document types in the corpus.
Taxonomic function Kinds of documents
delimitation
– of norms and spheres of authority (“religious”
vs. x)
Bendōwa ()
– from other teachings / traditions Bukkyō (“Buddha’s Sutras”, )
Shizen bikku (ca. ?)
internal differentiation
– sub-denominations (schools, groups, etc.) Bendōwa (), Bukkyō (“Buddha’s
Teaching”, )
– essential subjects, themes, issues Gakudō yōjin shū (), Bukkyō
(“Buddha’s Teaching”, ), Bukkyō
(“Buddha’s Sūtras”, ).
19 Dumoulin et al. 1990, Bielefeldt 1985.
20 This position was most prominently put forth by Hakamaya Noriaki and Matsumoto Shirō,
see Hakamaya 1992.
21 Heine 1994, 1997, 2006.
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self-evident that “the way” (dō 道) in question was the Buddha Way (butsudō
仏道), which, for fear of anachronism, I will for now refrain from equating with
“Buddhism” (bukkyō 仏教). There was in both cases no need to distinguish this
Buddha Way from other “ways” (whatever “way” meant), since Dōgen was
addressing an audience already committed to it; but there was some dispute
as to what precisely the Buddha Way consisted of, and what would be essential
to those who aspired to it.22 In these and other writings, extensive delimitation
from other teachings occurs only in terms of a rectification of perceived delu-
sions about the Buddha Way – including the idea that it was ultimately one with
the other teachings – and it is in this context where the latter is explicitly
identified. Furthermore, other teachings are never discussed, in Dōgen’s
works, for their own merits or for the sake of discussion or dialogue between
various different denominations.23
2 Negotiating the way
In the following, I shall discuss the texts in chronological order, starting with a
discourse analysis and proceeding to an elucidation of the semantic fields of key
terms.
As mentioned above, the first text, Bendōwa 辨道話 (“Discourse on nego-
tiating the way”; in the following: Discourse) was composed by Dōgen in autumn
1231 in the vernacular.24 We do not know exactly who was the recipient of the
manuscript, but it probably circulated among his disciples and relatives /
acquaintances at court at the time. Although the title indicates orality, there is
no evidence that it was based on actual verbal communication. This is in
contradistinction to a large part of the vernacular Shōbōgenzō collection,
which was based on informal “Dharma talks” given to various audiences at
Dōgen’s temples of residence.25
22 One feels tempted to write “to those who walked it,” but that, again, would be an anachron-
ism: the Buddha Way in Dōgen’s language is “attained,” “grasped,” or, horribile dictu,
“missed,” but one does not walk it. See Steineck 2018. This may in part be due to the fact
that the character dō道, if used in a verbal sense, meant “to say, to speak”, making the primary
meaning of butsudō “Buddha’s sayings” (cf. Bukkyōgo daijiten, entry “Butsudō”).
23 Lest this should invite an evolutionary view—from narrow parochialism to enlightened
generosity—let me hasten to remind the reader that four centuries earlier, the Shingon patriarch
Kūkai integrated all known teachings of the time into his system.
24 I have discussed this text in more detail in previous publications (Steineck 2009b and 2015),
and reiterate some points from these publications here in an abbreviated form.
25 Heine 1997.
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In terms of its overall sequence of propositions, Discourse starts with a
passage describing a mysterious practice shared by all enlightened beings. It
identifies this practice with seated meditation (zazen 坐禪) and extols it as the
superior gate to the state of self-induced immersion in highest insight (jijuyō
zammai 自受用三昧).26 Why this should be so, is in need of explanation, and
the explanation follows after the author has established his own record and
legitimatized his position as a teacher of the “right law/dharma of the Buddha
house (Bukke no shōbō 佛家の正法).”27 Remarkably (at least from a modern,
doctrine-oriented point of view), the first step in the explication proper con-
sists of a narrative of transmission.28 Only after that is the reader informed
about the metaphysical workings of the practice identified with highest
insight: Seated meditation is supposed to lead to immediate contact with all
Buddhas and patriarchs and to transform the realm of practice into one of
enlightenment.29 The following questions and answers delimit the teaching in
a field of competing interpretations of the Buddha Way. They also address
questions of the feasibility of its teaching for disciples remaining in the secular
world, thus displaying concern for individual salvation.30 There is no general
discussion of alternatives outside the Buddha Way, and no general survey of
the field of possible “ways” or “teachings.” Since the adressees have been
made out to be true disciples of the Buddha, such discussion would arguably
have been out of place. However, the question and answer part contains an
extensive refutation of the proposition of an eternal essence of enlightenment,
identified with the faculties of perception and discrimination. This view,
advanced by some Zen Buddhists, is identified by Dōgen as not belonging to
the Buddha Way.31 Furthermore, the final section contains an argument con-
cerning the legitimacy of the endeavour to explicate a new interpretation of the
Buddha Way without being authorized to do so by a royal request.32 It thus
points to a contemporary norm placing discussions on the Buddha Way under
the control of royal authority, and at the same time attempts to establish a
(possibly new) normative understanding that would accept legitimizing
motives beside authorization by royal command.
26 DZZ I: 729.
27 DZZ I: 730.
28 DZZ I: 730–731.
29 DZZ I: 731–732.
30 … and disproving Timothy Fitzgerald, who believes that such a concern was absent in
Japanese culture. Fitzgerald 1997: 94. Cf. DZZ I: 731–745.
31 DZZ I: 738–740.
32 DZZ I: 746.
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As to the mode of communication, the Discourse gives a first exposition of
Dōgen’s teaching, couched in terms of the “true essence” (shinketsu眞訣) of the
“right law/dharma of the Buddha house” (Bukke no shōbō 佛家の正法). Its
purported aim is to inform (shirashimen to su しらしめんとす) those earnestly
seeking the Buddha Way of this essence.33 The text is therefore primarily
referential, although it carries a strong conative overtone: it informs about
something that is “right” (shō/tadashi 正) and thus carries strong normative
expectations towards conduct. In fact, one might say that the ulterior motive is
conative, although the form of the message is largely referential. Occasional
emotive expressions concern either the sad fact of aberrant positions or the sad
fate of earnest seekers on the way who go astray because of the absence of true
teachers.
The choice of semantic sequences confirms this observation. The dominant
sequence type is that of explication, with several descriptive and narrative
sequences supporting the argument.
It should be noted that, by choosing to present his message as an explica-
tion (instead of an argument, or narrative), the author locates himself in a
position of authority that is in some contrast to his actual social status: still
young and with no clerical rank to speak of, and only the authorisation of a
Chinese master on record in a denomination that was not yet acknowledged by
royal authority in Japan, Dōgen had, in the eyes of his contemporaries, at this
point in time only questionable authority of judgment over other Buddhist
lineages and doctrines; what is more, he had gained some degree of notoriety
for having alienated parts of the clergy.34 For all his assumption of a position of
superior insight, the precariousness of his status is exposed in the final passage
of the Discourse, one of the few instances where Dōgen resorts to argumentation
in order to establish the legitimacy of the document itself.35 This would not have
been necessary had Dōgen been authorized by either the clergy or royal com-
mand to expatiate on his views – a position that he apparently sought, but never
achieved, and therefore a decade later disparaged in the fascicle “Buddha’s
Sutras.”36
33 DZZ I: 730.
34 See the materials presented in Ōkubo 1966: 185–190 and Funaoka 2014: 106–108. Ōkubo
believed that Dōgen was forced to live in obscurity because of pressure from the powerful
monks of Enryaku-ji, while Funaoka more cautiously argues that he probably simply fell out
with the community of Kennin-ji, where he was living for the first years after his return from
China.
35 DZZ I: 746.
36 DZZ I: 413, cf. Nishijima / Cross 1994–1999, vol. 3: 111.
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To sum up, this is a document presented by an expert of something called the
Buddha Way, commanding precarious credentials, to an audience that is expected
to share adherence to that way. The expert tries to assume a position of authority,
and he gives a new interpretation of said Buddha Way that is contestable;
however, he avoids to argue for his interpretation and instead resorts to explica-
tion, placing himself in a position of superior knowledge and insight. Conversely,
his readership is relegated to the position of disciples in need of instruction. The
main content of the ‘teaching’ is twofold: firstly, a history of transmission, and
secondly, a practice of meditation that is supposed to bring about immediate
contact, indeed unity, between the practitioner and beings of a superior quality. In
accordance with the discourse setting of ‘teaching’, the communication mode is
predominantly referential, although the ulterior goal is to change the recipients’
behavior. A further agenda consists in securing a separate field of normativity for
the Buddha Way beside that of legal authority, which resides uncontestedly (at
least as the Discourse is concerned) with the royal court.
In putting forward its interpretation of the “Buddha Way,” the Discourse
makes operative use of a web of logical and semantical relations that further
determine the meaning of the term beyond explicit propositional explication
or definition. The following table presents the various ways by which the
object of the teaching is identified in the initial exposition (sections Ia, Ib, Ib’
in Table 3).
Table 4: Identification/characterisation of the object of teaching.
Locus Quote / translation Identifying/qualifying terms
§ , DZZ I: . 諸佛如來、ともに妙法を單傳して、
阿耨菩提を證するに、最上無爲の妙
術あり。The Buddha-Tathāgatas
transmit the mysterious law/dharma
together, and in attesting to anuttara
bodhi (“supreme insight”) they
possess the miraculous technique of
highest wuwei/asaṃskṛta (“non-
interference/the unconditioned”).
– superior entities with honorific
names (Buddha, Tathāgata)
– predicates indicating the
extraordinary (wondrous/
miraculous)
– superlatives
– technical terms indicating
connection to a primary &
secondary locus (India, China)
(continued )
37 I prefer the term ‘extraordinary’ to ‘supernatural’, because ‘supernatural’ presupposes a
concept of ‘nature’ that excludes certain kinds of actions and events, such as ‘miracles’ and the
like, from the realm of the natural. Such a concept of nature did not exist in medieval Japan.
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Table 4: (continued )
Locus Quote / translation Identifying/qualifying terms
§ , DZZ I: . … 佛家の正法をしらしめんとす。こ
れ眞訣ならむかも。いはく、…
attempting to make known the right
law/dharma of the Buddha House.
This will surely match with the true
essence. It is said: …
– metonym (home & focal person/
founder (“Buddha House”)
– epistemic/practical norm (“right
dharma/law”)
– metaphysical predicate (“true
essence”)
ibd. 大師釋尊、靈山會上にして法を迦葉
につけ、祖祖正傳して、菩提達磨尊
者にいたる。… The great teacher,
the Venerable Śākya gave the law/
dharma to Kāśyapa during the
assembly on the Spirit Mountain, and
it was rightly transmitted from
patriarch to patriarch, until it reached
Bodhidharma. …
– founder (Śākyamuni)
– time and place of foundational
teaching
– line of transmission
§ , ibd. かくのごとく單傳して、おのづから
六祖大鑑禪師にいたる。このとき、
眞實の佛法まさに東漢に流演して、
節目にかかはらぬむねあらはれき。
Through such plain transmission, it
reached of itself the th patriarch
Dhyāna-Master Dajian. At this time,
the true real Buddha dharma/law
verily spread in the Eastern Han, and
the teaching beyond any measure
appeared.
– line of transmission
– epistemic-ontological normative
predicates (“true real”)
– transcendent predicate (“beyond
measure”)
ibd. ときに六祖に二位の神足ありき。…
その二派の流通するに、よく五門ひ
らけたり。いはゆる法眼宗、潙仰
宗、曹洞宗、雲門宗、臨濟宗なり。
見在、大宋には臨濟宗のみ天下にあ
まねし。五家ことなれども、ただ一
佛心印なり。At that time, the th
patriarch had two spiritual feet (i. e.,
capable disciples).… when the two
streams spread, five gates developed.
These are the Fayuan School, the
Guiyang school, the Caodong School,
the Yunmen school, and the Linji
School. Today, only the Linji School
holds sway in the Great Song [Empire].
The five houses may differ, but they are
only the one Buddha heart seal.
– internal differentiation: A single
tradition, differentiating in two
streams, ending up in five gates,
identified as shū (schools).
Emphasis on unity. Other Buddhist
schools are only implicitly
mentioned as having transmitted
writings only.
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As is apparent in the table, the teaching of the Discourse identifies its field of
concern via the names and honorific titles of beings with extraordinary or even
superlative qualities. These are said to transmit something of both epistemic and
practical normative significance. Strong emphasis is placed on a distinct line of
transmission. Technical terms point to a soteriology of insight leading to free-
dom/unconditioned existence.
The precise meaning of these defining aspects is put more sharply into relief
by an analysis of the semantical oppositions in which they stand in the text
itself. Some examples are given in the following table:
According to the Discourse, the Buddha Way thus stands in a fundamental and
antonymical opposition to all non-Buddhist views, which are characterized as
“outlying” and “obstructive”. Within the Buddha Way, there is an opposition
between the right transmission, defined by true practice (i. e. zazen), and the
transmission of the canonical writings only, without concomitant practice.
Accordingly, the right teachers, who transmit both an understanding of the
scriptures and the practice are opposed to those who only study and teach the
canon. Among adherents of the Buddha Way, there is furthermore a distinction
between those who formally reject ties and obligations to their family
(lit. “those leaving their house”) and those who continue to abide in the
profane world. This opposition, however, is overcome by the virtues of the
supreme practice taught by the Discourse. Finally, the Discourse also maintains
that the fundamental soteriological opposition between the cycle of birth and
Table 5: Fundamental oppositions.
Locus Focal term Opposed to Quality of opposition
DZZ I: ,  Right Law of the Buddha
House 仏家の正法
outlying ways 外道,
obstructive views 邪見
antonymical:
belonging vs.
excluded
,  right transmission 正傳¸
i. e. true 真 practice 修行
writings only/false 偽
practice
gradual: complete vs.
insufficient
 right teacher 正師 letter-studying teacher
of the law/dharma 文
字習學の法師
gradual: complete vs.
insufficient
 renunciants 出家人 men and women
abiding in the profane
world 在俗の男女
transcended
opposition: sublated
in superior practice
 birth-and-death 生死 Nirvana 涅槃 co-extensive, but
intensional antonyms
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death and Nirvana is purely intensional: there is thus no transcendent realm in
an ontological sense.
Further information about the semantics of the Buddha Way in the
Discourse can be gleaned from an analysis of the categorical relations into
which the key terms enter in the text. I shall use here a syncretic list of
categories collated (or, to be more honest, bastardized) from Aristoteles and
Kant. To start with substance, much concerning “what the Buddha Way is”
(according to the Discourse) has already been described in some detail above.
Highest, liberating insight, true practice (of seated meditation) and a line of
authoritative transmission appear to be most essential. In terms of quantity,
the Discourse maintains that the Buddha Way is one, although even its
orthodox tradition is differentiated into the five “houses”.38 These, by the
way, all belong to the Zen School (zenshū 禅宗), which the Discourse insists
on identifying with the Buddha Way: it is thus, according to its nomenclature,
not a “school” beside others, but the one true tradition of authentic practice
and teaching.39 As for its quality, the Buddha Way is real with additional
characterizations such as “mysterious,” “unsurpassed” or “right” pointing to
its extraordinary and normative aspects. Its fundamental unity notwithstand-
ing, the Buddha Way comprises such things as authoritative writings (kyōsho
経書), methods of practice (mon 門), three canonical fields of study (sangaku
三学), six perfections (rokudo 六度), etc.40 The Buddha Way is furthermore
locally positioned through an origin in India and a path of transmission via
China to Japan.41 Its temporal existence, however, is not bound by restric-
tions, as the Discourse insists that the substance of the way is identical
independent of time. Attainment of the Buddha Way is conditional on “right
trust” (shōshin 正信), and leads to “insight” (satori 悟り);42 right practice will
lead to full possession of the Way, but without practice, there is no posses-
sion. In the whole process, the Buddha Way is both passive, in its being
attained, and active, in its supporting those who commit themselves to right
practice.
To sum up, the semantic analysis of the Discourse makes the object of its
teaching look suspiciously like a religion: There is a soteriological agenda,
reference to beings of a higher quality, the idea of an orthodox teaching and
line of transmission, a practical and dogmatic normativity that bears strong
38 DZZ I: 730.
39 DZZ I: 736.
40 DZZ I: 734, 736.
41 DZZ I: 730.
42 DZZ I: 733.
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analogies to law but is not subsumed under state authority, a separate social
realm of dedicated practitioners, replete with its own hierarchies and fields of
study and expertise, and repeated reference to insights beyond the regular
human level and mysterious capacities. There are terms to conceive of other
teachings outside the Buddha Way. But they are highly charged with negative
values and thus far from neutral. The common denominator would be -dō 道
(“way”), although this term does not appear, in the Discourse, as a general noun
subsuming both the “Buddha Way” and the “Outlying Ways”.
In this sense, the similarity of the semantic field between the Buddha Way
according to the Discourse and the classical modern notion of religion may still
be misleading. To briefly discuss some of the more salient differences, in terms
of substance, the Discourse may make ample reference to the mysterious and
extraordinary qualities of the Buddhas, Bodhisattvas, and patriarchs, whom it
clearly treats as elevated and sacred beings, but it disqualifies the notion of an
ontologically transcendent realm with soteriological qualities. Although it men-
tions “right trust” (shin, which could also be translated as “belief”) as an
important condition of salvation, trust is not so much characterized by belief
in certain doctrines, but by unwavering dedication to the “true practice” of
seated meditation. The “doctrinal” elements are again not so much concerned
with the actions and commandments of a higher being, but first and foremost
with a lineage of transmission, and secondly, again, with the realization of right
practice. If the Buddha Way of the Discourse is a religion, it appears to be more
concerned with what people do, than with what they think or believe. However,
this again may be a misleading exoticism, since the practice in question is
supposed to lead to right – even supreme – insight, and thus to a substantial
change in the cognitive state of the practitioner. Furthermore, we need to
remember that the Discourse places itself in a tradition that sees “ignorance”
(mumyō 無明) as the root of all evil. Then again, in the language of the
Discourse, insight is not so much a question of subjective “experience,” but a
matter of “proof” (shō 證) through action in accordance with the standard
established by the Buddhas and Patriarchs.43
3 Confirming the essentials
It would be tedious to discuss the other texts in similar detail, since there is
no major change in the semantic of the Buddha Way in comparison with
43 DZZ I: 729.
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the Discourse. I will therefore focus on additional aspects and important
qualifications.
The Gakudō yōjin shū學道用心集 (“Essentials of Studying the Way,” below:
Essentials44) is a short document of ten sections written 1234 in the kanbun
(logographic notation) style as a basic manual for Dōgen’s monastic disciples.
Unlike the Discourse, it is not a document that attempts to convince outsiders or
potential, but as yet unconfirmed disciples. Instead, it was probably written for
the basic instruction of the monastic community that had begun to form around
Dōgen at that time. In keeping with the apparent aim to guide and educate, the
communicative mode is informative-referential and conative. The dominant type
of semantic sequence is again explicative. But in Essentials (as opposed to the
Discourse) this is a choice in keeping with the status of the adresser, because
Dōgen was the uncontested preceptor of this community.
That said, it should be noted that an eighteenth century commentary attests
to a remarkable aspect of text usage that stands in some contrast to these
observations, as it enjoins members of the monastic community to recite the
text on a daily basis.45 We do not know when this kind of text usage originated,
but should it have been intended from the start, the Essentials may have not
been for purposes of information to the extent the communicative mode of the
text suggests; instead, they would have served as a kind of aide-memoire, and as
a token of allegiance to the founder.
As regards the previous discussion about the status of the cognitive versus
the practical in Dōgen’s Buddha Way, the first section of the Essentials sig-
nificantly deals with the postulate “to bring forth the bodhi-mind” (Bodaishin o
hassubeki koto可發菩提心事).46 The technical term “bodhi-mind” is elucidated
by a reference to an alleged saying of the Indian partriach Nāgārjuna identify-
ing it with “the mind singly contemplating birth and cessation and the imper-
manence of the profane world” (tada seken no shōmetsu mujō wo kanzuru
kokoro 唯觀世間生滅無常心). As Dōgen explains, to focus for a long time on
such contemplation will prevent the arousal of the “thought of a permanent
self” (goga no kokoro 吾我心) and of craving after “fame and gain” (myōri 名
利); instead, the practictioner of such contemplation will “practice the way like
he was trying to save himself from a fire on his head” (gyōdō wa zunen wo
sukuu 行道救頭燃).47 Obviously, while the Buddha Way is realized through
44 DZZ II: 253–260.
45 Shinohara 1990: 259. The reference is to the Gakudō yōjinshū monge 学道用心集聞解, a
commentary by Menzan Zuihō 面山瑞方 (1683–1769).
46 DZZ II: 253.
47 Ibd.
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practice, such practice must be sustained by whole-hearted cognizance of a
certain ontological truth.48 Incidentally, the Essentials sum up proper conduct
of disciples of the Buddha Way by two components: listening to the teaching
of a “right master,” and practicing seated meditation. Here again, we find the
combination of a cognitive activity with a practice as defining the core of the
right path.
As is apparent from the phrases quoted in the above paragraph, the
Essentials operate with a contrastive opposition of the common world and the
Buddha’s teaching that is strongly reminiscent of the distinction between the
profane and the sacred. Consider the first explicative sentence of section three
“In the Buddha Way, it is absolutely necessary to prove and enter by way of
practice” (Butsudō wa kanarazu gyō ni yorite shōnyū subeki koto佛道必依行可證
入事): “A common (zoku 俗) [teacher] said: Through study one can gain wealth.
The Buddha taught: Within practice there is realization (shō證). It is unheard-of
that without studying someone should earn wealth or that without practicing
someone should attain realization.”49 While the emphasis in this passage is on
the analogies between both realms, the distinction is clearly maintained, and
other sections repeatedly reinforce the contrasting of “fame and gain” (the
alleged principle of the common world) with the bodhi-mind and the realm of
right practice and enlightenment.
Section 7 of the Essentials contains an instance, singular in our corpus,
where the nominal phrase dō is used as a hyperonym denoting all extant “ways”.
This, however, is balanced by the immediate assertion of the absolute super-
iority of the Buddha Dharma/Law: “The Buddha Dharma excels among various
ways. For that reason people seek it. When the Tathāgata dwelt in the world,
there were no two teachings and no two teachers.”50
In sum, analysis of the semantics in the Essentials confirms the impression
that Dōgen’s concept of the Buddha Way is in many ways congruent with the
modern notion of religion, with the important qualifications that strong empha-
sis is placed on the question of lineage and allegiance to a “right master,” and
that a specific practice (seated meditation) with a strong corporeal aspect is
48 Is it sophistry to remark here that Immanuel Kant defined “belief” by an assumption of the
truth of a particular proposition that is supported by experience and reason and strong enough
to become the basis of action? Cf. his Critique of Pure Reason, A 822–828/B851–856; Kant 1998:
852–857.
49 English translation modified after Tanahashi 1985: 33.; cf. DZZ II: 254.
50 ET modified after ibd.: 39. Migi, buppō wa shodō ni masaretari, yue ni hito kore o motomu.
Nyorai zaise wa mattaku nikyō nashi, mattaku nishi nashi. 右佛法勝于諸道。所以人求之。如來
在世。全無二教。全無二師。 DZZ II: 258.
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presented as essential part of the doctrine. Furthermore, while dō and kyō
can function as hyperonyms which, in principle, subsume various ‘religions’,
Dōgen regularly denies the equivalence of the hyponyms and insists on the
superiority of the Buddha Way he promotes: his taxonomy is clearly a partisan
one, and not crafted or suited to the equanimous contemplation and analysis of
various ways of life.
3.1 Insisting on Buddha’s teachings
According to its colophons, the fascicle “Buddha’s teachings” is based on an
informal lecture Dōgen gave to his monastic community at Kōshō-ji, in the
vicinity of Heian-kyō (present day Kyōto), in December 1241 or 1242.51 It appar-
ently reacts to the influx of a new group of followers hailing from the Nihon
Daruma shū 日本達磨宗, in the spring of 1241. The latter denomination was an
ill-fated school of Zen that had been outlawed for its allegedly antinomian
teachings.52
In this fascicle, Dōgen maintains a mystical and holistic view, according to
which the Buddha’s teaching is one and ever-present in all parts of reality – a
position that was probably shared by his addressees. At the same time, he takes
issue with an interpretation of this position that would identify supreme truth
with an insight transcending language, transmitted outside the verbal teachings
as laid down in the canonical writings (Skt. sūtra, Jap. kyō 経), and commu-
nicated independently of them (kyōge betsuden 教外別傳).53 This position was
widely held within the Song period Chan school,54 and apparently it was also
embraced by the followers of the Nihon Daruma shū.
The fascicle takes the form of an argumentative sequence. It starts with the
thesis that the Buddha’s teaching is one and ever-present, which probably
constituted the common ground between Dōgen and his new followers. The
scriptures are, as Dōgen goes on to qualify, one of its integral parts. This is
opposed to the view that “the one mind that is the supreme vehicle” was
communicated by way of a separate transmission, outside and apart from verbal
teachings. The antithesis is refuted by way of, among others, a reductio ad
51 DZZ I: 306–314, here: p. 314. ET in Nishijima/Cross 1994–1999, vol. 2: 55–69; here: p. 69.
Nishijima and Cross list only one colophon, dating the text to 1241.
52 Ōkubo 1966: 406–446, esp. 416–418; Faure 1987, Heine 2006: 158.
53 DZZ I: 307. Cf. Nishijima / Cross 1994–1999, vol 2: 56.
54 See Foulk 1999.
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absurdum type of argument: if the true heart of the Buddha was communicated
outside the verbal teachings, the teachings would conversely be “transmitted
outside of the heart” (shingebetsuden 心外別傳), and then they should not have
been delivered at all.55
Dōgen then discusses two cases from Zen lore that seem to corroborate the
standpoint of a separate transmission, and argues to the contrary. In this
context, he gives a detailed description of three paradigms of internal differ-
entiation of the teaching into “three vehicles” (sanjō 三乗), “twelve divisions of
the teaching” (jūni bunkyō 十二分教), and “nine divisions of the teaching”
(kyūbunkyō 九分教), respectively56. This descriptive sequence takes up the
remainder of the fascicle. We need not review the details here. Suffice it to say
that the first term (“three vehicles”) refers to the standard Buddhist paths
towards salvation (by hearing the Buddha teach and following his advice, by
reaching enlightenment by oneself, and by dedicating oneself to the path of the
Bodhisattva, vowing to save all sentient beings before attaining nirvana for
oneself). The second and third term pertain to different ways of listing and
sub-dividing Buddhist lore, including not only sūtras and commentaries, but
also legendary accounts of previous lives and miraculous deeds of the Buddha.
In the context of the fascicle, the descriptive sequence supports the main
thesis in two ways: The antithesis mentions only the “three vehicles” and
“twelve divisions.” By adding a third paradigm of internal differentiation,
Dōgen assumes a position of superior knowledge, placing him above his
opponents.
Secondly, Dōgen insists that each part of each division is an inclusive
realization of the whole of the Buddha’s teaching, and that no realization of
this teaching negates or excludes another. In other words, Dōgen embraces the
holistic viewpoint that the Buddha’s teaching is present in every single particle
of dust. But he also argues that when it is perceived as such, the resulting
insight must comprehend what is said in the scriptures.
In sum, this is an argument about the binding character of a certain set of
verbal / written teachings, and the orthodox ways of practice. Both are con-
nected to the Buddha. Together with him, they form the ultimate source of
authority. The verbal / written teachings, subdivided alternatively into twelve
or nine groups, are therefore posited as integral and essential to the holistic view
that supreme insight is somehow present in every part of reality. There is a
canon of verbal teachings and practical instructions that is elevated as the
55 DZZ I: 308. Cf. Nishijima / Cross 1994–1999, vol 2: 57.
56 DZZ I: 310–134; ET: Nishijima / Cross 1994–1999, vol. 2: 60–68.
196 Raji C. Steineck
Bereitgestellt von | UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zürich
Angemeldet
Heruntergeladen am | 17.05.18 09:25
standard against which to measure claims to enlightened insight. The fascicle
thus informs both about the essential elements of the Buddha Way and its
internal differentiation in terms of practical paths and groups of verbal / written
teachings.
“Buddha’s Sutras” (Bukkyō 佛經)57 continues this argument, while adding
the topic of external delimitation. Its colophon states that it is based on an
informal lecture given to Dōgen’s community in the fall of the year Kangen 1
(1243), during a temporary retreat at Kippō-ji in Echizen province.58 It was thus
delivered shortly after the community had left their home temple Kōshō-ji near
the capital and relocated to the somewhat remote province of Echizen in
Western Japan. This somewhat dramatic move is much debated in the literature,
because its reasons are not explained in any of the texts associated with Dōgen.
As Steven Heine and Funaoka Makoto have summed up in their respective
reviews of the sources and literature on the subject, pressure from the dominant
Tendai school on mount Hiei was probably one factor. The success of Enni
Ben’en 円爾弁円 (1202–1280), a representative of the competing Rinzai Zen
school, also played a part. Enni had secured patronage by a top court official
and was appointed head of the Tōfuku-ji, a major monastery under construction
close to Dōgen’s Kōshō-ji.59
These external factors, signs of severe competition between monasteries and
clerics for aristocratic and state patronage, may have prompted Dōgen to give up
on the project to become something like an officially acclaimed “teacher of the
realm” (kokushi 国師), an ambition that is clearly visible in early texts like the
Discourse. Instead, he now re-oriented his community towards the ideal of
reclusive life (tonsei 遁世),60 and strove to develop a model of temple adminis-
tration that would ensure a large degree of freedom from political machinations
and interference.61 The choice of Echizen as a location for the reclusive mon-
astery was probably influenced by an offer for temple grounds from Dōgen’s
patron Hatano Yoshishige. Connections between his Nihon Daruma-shū fol-
lowers, many of whom hailed from a temple in this region, may also have
played their part.62 This latter motive would explain why Dōgen may have felt
57 DZZ I: 405–414. ET in Nishijima / Cross 1994–1999, vol. 3: 101–112.
58 DZZ I: 414; Nishijima / Cross.
59 Heine 2006: 156–172; Funaoka 2014: 175–177.
60 On this disctinction and its ramifications, see Matsuo, “What is Kamakura New Buddhism?
Official Monks and Reclusive Monks.”
61 Heine 2006: 32, 193, based on Ishii 2002.
62 Ōkubo 1966, 418–419; Heine 2006: 158.
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an increased need to convince this segment of his community of his own vision
of proper understanding and practice, because for them, returning to the vicinity
of their home temple would have reinforced old allegiances. In the absence of
clear textual evidence, however, all this remains a reasoned conjecture.
The fascicle “Buddha’s Sutras” reiterates the point that the sutras are an
integral part of the teaching, and that seeing them as such is a criterion against
which to measure the level of insight. This is contrasted to the teaching of
“unreliable stinking skin-bags” (zusan no shūhitai 杜撰の臭皮袋)63 in the Song
empire who exclusively rely on silent meditation and posit the ultimate unity of
the teachings of the Buddha with those of Daoism (dōkyō 道教) and
Confucianism (jukyō 儒教).64 The latter view held some popularity in China
and was imported to Japan by monks, mostly from the Linji/Rinzai Zen school,
who strove to bring the latest new trends from the center of the East Asian
cultural sphere to the periphery, their homeland Japan.65
Remarkably, Dōgen in this passage uses terms that are homonymous to
modern Japanese denominational designations, although here they clearly
refer to what is being said in the respective literary traditions (and not also
for institutions, rituals, and so on). The terms are also used interchangeably
with metonymical expressions, which identify traditions by way of their
founder figures (Rō Kō no oshie 老孔の教え, “the teachings of Laozi and
Confucius”).66
While Dōgen concedes that there may be some validity in both traditions, he
insists that neither Laozi nor Confucius were able to grasp the principle of
karmic causality, and the presence of ultimate truth in every instance.67 The
invectives against aberrant views within the Zen school are further connected to
derogatory remarks about the patriach Linji that place him among the lower
ranks of Zen patriarchs. This polemic may have been related to the attempt to
convince the Nihon Daruma-shū followers of the superiority of Dōgen’s own
interpretation, which integrated the written teachings and orthodox practice into
a holistic mystical vision. Or, it may have been an attempt to strengthen ties
63 Nishijima / Cross 1994–1999, vol. 3: 106; DZZ I: 408.
64 DZZ I: 411; Nishijima / Cross 1994–1999, vol. 3: 108–110.
65 Dōgen’s words clearly speak against the hypothesis of Timothy Brook (1992: 16–18) that the
idea of the unity of the three teachings developed only later, in the Yuan Empire. See also fn. 72
below.
66 DZZ I: 411; Nishijima / Cross 1994–1999, vol. 3: 109.
67 DZZ I: 411; cf. Nishijima / Cross 1994–1999, vol. 3: 109–110. See also the following
paragraph.
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within Dōgen’s community vis-à-vis the upcoming Enni Ben’en.68 In any case,
where “Buddha’s teaching” is spelling out the essential contents and their sub-
divisions, “Buddha’s Sutras” ranks teachers and teachings within and outside of
the Buddha Way according to the measure of full and comprehensive insight –
an insight that is, Dōgen insists, both documented in the canonical literature
and transmitted between Buddhas and patriarchs. Since he claims to stand in
this line of transmission, he retains for himself a superior vantage point of
judgment.
To sum up, “Buddha’s Sutras” uses kyō 教 as a general label that can be
attached to a qualifying component. The resulting character compounds bukkyō
佛教, dōkyō 道教, and jukyō 儒教, referencing Buddhist, Daoist, and Confucian
traditions of thought and literature, are homonymous with present-day denomi-
national designations, and synonymous with metonymical expressions such as
“the teaching of Laozi/Confucius”. Dōgen, however, does not use kyō (or its
Japanese reading oshie) as a hypernym. Furthermore, he establishes a clear
ranking between the traditions, with insight into the law of karmic causality
functioning as one of the differentiae specificae placing the Buddha’s teaching in
a class of its own. Within the confines of Buddhist teaching and their interpreta-
tion, Dōgen insists on a comprehensive and holistic interpretation, and uses
derogatory language vis-à-vis exponents of competing views and clerics who
base their claim to leadership on political support.
3.2 Castigating heresies
The last document to be discussed here is not dated, but was probably written
around 1250. By this time, Dōgen had begun to work on a new edition of his
collection of vernacular treatises. Shizen biku 四禪比丘 (“The bhikṣu (‘monk’) in
the fourth stage of dhyāna (‘immersion’)”; quoted in the following as
Immersion)69 belongs to this new collection, of which 12 fascicles were com-
pleted. It has been argued that this group of texts was directed at an audience of
devotees remaining in the common world, in contrast to the earlier collection,
which had adressed primarily the inner circle of monastic disciples.70
68 His invective against monks who assume a position of superiority because of their backing
high-ranking patrons supports this conjecture. Cf. DZZ I: 413; Nishijima / Cross 1994–1999,
vol. 3: 111.
69 DZZ I: 704–716; ET: Nishijima / Cross 1994–1999, vol. 4: 195–212.
70 Heine 1997.
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Again, the treatise is concerned with what Dōgen perceives to be fatal
misconceptions among followers of the Buddha Way. It starts out with a story,
taken from the treatise Dazhidulun71, of a monk who, upon entering a deep stage
of immersion, mistakenly believes he has reached the state of a saint (arhat, Jap.
arakan 阿羅漢). This state should lead the practitioner to have a vision of a
perfect Buddha realm at the end of his life. When he fails to have that vision, he
concludes that the Buddha’s teaching is wrong. Karmic retribution immediately
follows, leading the monk to be born into an undesirable form of existence.72
Immersion draws on this story to warn disciples not to set their own faculty
of judgment above that of the Buddha. In addition, it castigates various views
that stem from conflating the wisdom of the unenlightened with that of the
Buddha Way. In this context, the text strongly emphasizes the opposition
between the common life in the world, and the Buddha way. As a part of this
discussion, it reiterates a point already made in “Buddha’s Sutras”, and repudi-
ates the view of the “unity of the three teachings” (sankyō itchi 三教一致) of
Confucius, Laozi and the Buddha.73 Immersion once more wholeheartedly rejects
this vision, and insists on the superiority of the Buddha Way in a manner that
introduces a clear distinction between teachings (kyō 教) pertaining to common
life and those that transcend its limits.
While it does not postulate an ontologically transcendent realm, the text
clearly insists on the extraordinary faculties that distinguish enlightened beings
from commoners; and it refers to knowledge transcending the boundaries of the
present life as precisely one such criterion of distinction. Immersion sums up:
Those who study the way must be very clear about this: Confucius and Laozi did not know
the dharma/law of the three temporal worlds, nor did they know the principle of cause and
effect, nor did they know anything about how to establish peacefulness in one continent,
not to speak of establishing it in all four continents.74
It is, however, not simply their extraordinary, superhuman powers that set the
enlightened beings apart from teachers of the common life. As another passage
71 Purportedly Kumārajiva’s translation of Nāgārjuna’s Mahā prajñā pāramitā upadeṣa, Taishō
No. 1509, Vol. 25.
72 DZZ I: 704. Cf. Dazhidulun, Taishō No. 1509, Vol. 25: 189.
73 In Shizen Bikku, Dōgen paraphrases this term (DZZ I: 708), but he verbally quotes it in Eihei
kōroku V, 383, see DZZ II: ; ET: Leighton / Okumura : 342. In this formal lecture, he also
unambigiously rejects that position.
74 Gakusha akiraka ni shirubeshi, Kō Rō wa sanze no hō o shirazu, inga no dōri o shirazu, isshū
no anritsu o shirazu, iwanya shishū no anritsu o shiranya. 學者あきらかにしるべし、孔老は三
世の法をしらず、因果の道理をしらず、一洲の安立をしらず、いはんや四洲の安立をしらん
や。DZZ I: 713. Cf. Nishijima 1999: 207.
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from Immersion makes clear, the realm of the “common world” includes beings
with extraordinary, superhuman powers such as the Indian gods Indra and
Brahma; but, Immersion maintains, these are inferior to any human being who
has chosen to renunciate and follow the path of monastic life:
And not even Wheel-turning Lords, Lord Brahma, or Indra himself are the equal of a monk
who has left home life behind and been ordained, so how could they be equal to the
Tathāgata?75
This, now, does pose a challenge to the notion of ‘religion’: apparently, in
Dōgen’s conception the fundamental distinction is between two realms that
are extensionally one but intensionally distinct. The realm of “common life”
(zoku 俗) comprises human beings, among them elevated wise men such as
Confucius and Laozi, as well as gods with miraculous powers, who receive
(although Immersion does not elaborate on this) cultic reverences that would
fall under most accepted versions of the concept of ‘religion.’ The realm of the
Buddha Way again comprises human beings and the enlightened ones, who
have attained higher powers. Both are held to be ‘sacred,’ although to differ-
ent degrees. In any case, doubt concerning the teaching of the Buddha Way
amounts to ‘slander’ (bō 謗), and is threatened with massive karmic retribu-
tion. The fundamental distinction is thus incommensurate with that between
the ‘numinous’ in a general sense, and the ordinary. It does conform, how-
ever, to the idea that religion is concerned with soteriology; indeed, soteriol-
ogy here defines what counts as ‘truly sacred', singling out those aspects of
the miraculous and extraordinary that pertain to an (alleged) superior knowl-
edge of the world’s condition and its consequences for the achievement of
salvation.
Readers in accord with classical modern theory of religion might be tempted
to interpret this as conforming to an evolutionary pattern according to which
some purely religio-ethical idea supersedes a more primitive attachment to the
miraculous. It deserves mentioning, however, that Immersion as well as other
writings from the Dōgen Canon, such as the Discourse, are far from de-empha-
sizing the miraculous powers of the Buddhas, Bodhisattvas and Patriarchs. Quite
to the contrary, Immersion even lists knowledge about “sacred relics” (shari 舎
利; from Skt. śarīra) among the defining differences between the Buddha
Dharma and the teachings of Confucius and Laozi, who possess no such
75 Rin'ō, Bon'ō, Taishaku, nao shukke jugu no bikku ni oyobazu, ika ni iwanya Nyorai ni
hitoshikaranya. 輪王、梵王、帝釋、なほ出家受具の比丘に及ばず、いかにいはんや如來にひ
としからんや。DZZ I: 710. Cf. Nishijima 1999: 203.
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knowledge,76 while the Discourse eulogizes the miraculous effects of seated
meditation in no unsure terms. In sum, the teachings of our corpus are no
champion of “enlightened religion” in the modern, Western sense – and how
could or should they, in the absence of those concepts of science that would
force the miraculous out of the natural world?
4 Conclusions
To briefly sum up, a careful analysis of the semantics of focal terms in our
corpus revealed important analogies with prevalent modern notions of religion;
among them are the fundamental distinction between a sphere of common life
and an elevated sphere of the sacred, which is the source of salvation and
conforms to laws of its own, standing outside and above the legal and political
authority of common society; the requirement to place trust in the authority of
elevated beings, who are believed to possess extraordinary powers of insight
and manipulation of reality; the notion of an orthodoxy, denial of which is
threatened with dire consequences; the emphasis on a “truth” that calls for
belief, even if such belief is supported by evidence from stringent contemplation
of common life; and last but not least, general terms that subsume various
traditions as so many instances of a kind.
Analogies, however, are not equivalences, and the notion of religion may
become a ‘false friend’ if important divergences are ignored: in our corpus, the
general terms are never used in a neutral way; they are, in other words, regularly
connected to evaluative predications that imply a strict qualitative hierarchy
between the referents of the hyponyms; orthodoxy, at least in the Discourse, is
defined not by a set of abstract doctrines, but first by lineage and then by ritual
practice (although Immersion suggests that some essential doctrines, such as
that of karmic retribution, exist); the common world is identified as a sphere of
reality that comprises elevated beings with superhuman powers, who are the
object of legitimate cultic reverence; the sphere of the sacred is intensionally,
but not extensionally posited above the common world; certain miraculous and
magical powers and effects are an essential element of the superiority of the
sacred realm.
A further question concerns the evaluation of these results. One may argue
that the corpus of my analysis was identified and designed in a manner that pre-
conditioned it to find analogies to religion. It is certainly correct to say that, in
76 DZZ I: 712.
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singling out texts serving to define and elucidate a new teaching, and to educate
a community of disciples dedicated to following a teacher, I was led by modern
notions of religion (as defined by doctrine, as built by founding figures and
centered around leaders, and so forth). Awareness of this circle of reasoning is
definitely important in order to prevent one from drawing exaggerated conclu-
sions. What the analysis above demonstrates is simply that there is a text
corpus, centered around such a teacher from the Japanese medieval period.
This person articulated ideas with certain, essential conformances to modern
ideas of religion, and he found a community of followers who shared his vision
to some degree. These then built a tradition that has lasted until today. While
this may sound trivial, it still proves wrong those who believe the concept of
religion to be without true referent in pre-modern times. Yet again, this does not
mean that one can now triumphantly apply this concept, without hesitation or
much further ado, and expatiate on Japanese religiosity. Quite to the contrary,
the analysis above has shown that, even with such pre-selection of texts, there
are, on many levels, important divergences to received notions of religion, and
these surely demand attention. To re-iterate just one point pertaining not to
content, but to performativity: As we have seen above, even a seemingly
discursive, explicative text like the Essentials was recommended for use in
later times not so much as an object of reflective reading and discussion, but
as an object of recitation, a practice that prioritizes appresentation of words over
representation of meaning. There is good reason from evidence in the Dōgen
Canon to believe that this way of reading was predominant even in Dōgen’s
community, and that it was connected to belief in the beneficial karmic effects of
such appresentation of words.77 If we focus exclusively on discursive statements
of belief, we may well miss what was most essential to those participating in
Japanese medieval religion.
Furthermore, one cannot equate Dōgen’s conceptualization of the Buddha
Way with common Japanese notions of his time. In many respects (and his
employment of references to the miraculous and magical notwithstanding), he
was a representative of ‘high religion,’ speaking to a limited circle of literate
believers from the upper strata of society. Even so, he was evidently often at
odds with the views of his audiences/readers. It was modern scholarship that
fashioned him as one representative of “Kamakura New Buddhism,” and thus, of
a distinctly Japanese religiosity.78 And part of his modern renown may well stem
77 Cf. the fascicle “Reading sūtras” (Kankin看經) in the vernacular Shōbōgenzō collection (DZZ
I: 268–276); cf. also Steineck 2009a; 2011.
78 Most notably, Watsuji Tetsurō’s pertinent monography on Dōgen, which was recently
translated into English, see Watsuji und Bein 2011.
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from the fact that his writings offer enough analogies to modern notions of
religion to let him appear, to willing eyes, as a forerunner of contemporary
ideals. In terms of historiography, it is thus definitely essential to place Dōgen
firmly in the context of the society and culture of his time.
At the same time, the semantical analysis given above has provided us with
a nuanced image of the way in which one medieval Japanese intellectual
conceived of his own religion and the various teachings of his time. It has
proven itself capable of producing information that can correct received notions,
and it is thus a road worth taking in exploring concepts of religion – even if it is
in need of complementation by other historiographical methods.
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